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eath is a dominating presence in David Bergen’s Giller 
Prize-winning novel The Time in Between (2005). Although 
Charles Boatman’s suicide lies at the centre of the narrative, 
the novel — and Charles himself — is also haunted by other deaths: 
the death of Charles’s ex-wife, Sara, the deaths of innocents in Vietnam, 
and the deaths of animals. It rotates around various absences and, as is 
frequently the case in Bergen’s fiction, highlights individual suffering 
and alienation within the family unit1: Charles returns to Vietnam in 
the hope of ascribing meaning to the “great field of nothing” that he 
has experienced since the war (38), while two of his children, Ada and 
Jon, travel to Vietnam to search for their missing father only to discover 
he has committed suicide. Ada is repeatedly confronted by the loss of 
life, both human and animal, in her own experiences and through the 
experiences of others. Her reading of her father’s confessional suicide 
note and of Dang Tho’s In a Dark Wood — the fictional narrative 
embedded in the novel that her father reads before his death — pro-
vides Ada with accounts of past deaths that profoundly affect her own 
life. Such acts of learning and remembering through reading narrative 
perhaps offer models for our own reading of the book as an experience 
that encourages us to remember, or think about, the realities of war 
that surround the fictional lives of Bergen’s characters. In doing so, the 
reader is also encouraged to be critically aware of the human and animal 
relationships presented in the novel and to consider the responsibilities 
one has toward the Other.2 The relationship presented between human 
and animal deaths, in particular, draws attention to the ways in which 
characters recognize or fail to recognize the Other — human or non-
human animal — as a subject, and highlights the ethical violence that 
may result from such a lack of recognition. My use of the term recogni-
tion draws on Judith Butler’s theory of ethical relations. In Giving an 
Account of Oneself, Butler builds on a Levinasian ethics and argues that 
in order to recognize the Other, one must learn the “ability to affirm 
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what is contingent and incoherent” (41). For Butler, only by recogniz-
ing the limits of self-knowledge can one ethically recognize the Other; 
ethics, she argues, “requires us to risk ourselves precisely at moments of 
unknowingness” (136).3 It is by recognizing the limits of their ability 
to definitively “know” the past and the Other that Charles and Ada, in 
separate ways, move toward a more ethical position. 
Through the relationship between human and animal deaths, the 
novel confronts characters’ epistemological limits and questions what it 
means to be human/humane, while suggesting the potentially human-
izing effect of remembering and retelling the past. At the same time, 
however, it also suggests that the desire to understand the past can be 
a selfish pursuit that atrophies ties to the living in the present time. 
Indeed, as this tension between the desire for knowledge and the recog-
nition of the inability to fully know suggests, the novel presents several 
opposing concerns that are held together by an overarching focus on 
death and ethics. For example, the relationship between narrative rep-
resentations of humans and animals that reinforces the importance of 
an ethical relationship toward the Other is, at the same time, countered 
by the suggestion that the human capacity to tell stories sets us apart 
from animals; similarly, the potentially redemptive power of storytelling 
and of “looking back” is presented as dangerous when this focus on the 
past becomes narcissistic. These various threads, which are frequently in 
tension with each other, suggest the novel’s interest in unsettling clearly 
defined categories (such as past/present, knowledge/ignorance, human/
animal) and in presenting the complex, subjective human experience 
of feeling, as the novel’s title suggests, in between these categories. 
Like the novel, this essay makes no attempt to resolve these tensions. I 
read Bergen’s refusal to provide a teleological account of his characters’ 
experiences as intentional: the relationship between human and animal 
deaths and the variety of often contradictory threads that I identify 
in the novel suggest a resistance to fixed meaning, understanding, or 
resolution, and thus echo the narrative’s movement toward an ethics 
that recognizes the importance of unknowability and epistemic limits. 
The narrative-within-a-narrative structure of The Time in Between 
draws attention to the frequently redemptive power of storytelling in 
the novel, but also to the novel’s focus on suffering and on individual 
points of view. In Regarding the Pain of Others, Susan Sontag writes, 
“Remembering is an ethical act, has ethical value in and of itself. 
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Memory is, achingly, the only relation we can have with the dead” (115). 
In her discussion of the role of photographs in the remembering process, 
Sontag writes that “[harrowing] photographs do not inevitably lose their 
power to shock. But they are not much help if the task is to understand. 
Narratives can make us understand” (89). Reading Tho’s account of 
Kiet’s journey into his own “dark woods,”4 Charles revives memories 
of his wartime experiences in an attempt to find meaning in them, just 
as Ada later attempts to understand her father’s experiences by read-
ing the same book. Kiet’s descent into the abyss of wartime horrors is 
reminiscent of Dante’s journey through hell in the Inferno, the opening 
lines of which are directly referenced in the title of the narrative: “In 
the middle of our life’s way / I found myself in a wood so dark / That I 
couldn’t tell where the straight path lay” (1-3). Although Charles often 
unwillingly remembers his experiences with death through dreams, 
he moves progressively toward a position of wilful remembering, most 
obviously displayed in his choice to return to Vietnam and read In a 
Dark Wood. As Charles reads Tho’s book to try to make sense of his 
experiences, Ada, in turn, listens to her father’s stories in the hope of 
better understanding him: she “believed that each successive story was 
like a thread, and she was collecting those pieces” (39). For instance, she 
rereads the part of Tho’s story that describes the “death of the mother 
and baby” in order to imagine “the complexity of her father’s response 
and how he might have seen himself in the story” (245). 
These acts of reading mirror our own reading of The Time in 
Between. Reading the novel becomes a process that necessarily involves 
thinking about or imagining the suffering of others; as Butler writes 
in response to Sontag, narrative may be capable of producing an ethi-
cal pathos not available in photography (Frames of War 69). Such a 
focus on suffering runs throughout Bergen’s fiction. As Neil Besner 
has discussed, Bergen’s “fiction in general constitutes an inquiry into 
the nature of suffering, be it grief, the conflicts brought on by desire 
fulfilled or not (often illegitimate desire of one kind or another), the 
difficult but necessary yearning for salvation” (par. 4). The pathos 
of Bergen’s writing evokes a responsiveness to suffering: The Time in 
Between upholds the value of looking back — of thinking about the 
traumatic past and the suffering of others in a way that encourages in 
its characters, and in us as readers, a reconsideration of the value of life, 
both human and animal. This is not to say that humans and animals 
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become equals in the story, but rather, as David Clark has insightfully 
claimed in his response to Emmanuel Levinas’s short essay “The Name 
of a Dog, or Natural Rights,” that both are “capable of illuminating 
each other in their separate darkness” (186). As Levinas’s essay draws 
an “unstated analogy between the murder of the Jews and the killing of 
animals [in order to create] a rhetorical neighbourhood in which animals 
and humans dwell and summon each other into responsibility” (Clark 
178), Bergen’s narrative offers an analogy between human murders and 
the killing of animals in Vietnam. In this vein, The Time in Between 
appears heavily influenced by Timothy Findley’s The Wars (1977) in 
its focus on the physical and psychological damage caused by war and 
in its questioning of what it means to be human through a depiction 
of human-animal relations.5 For example, when Findley’s protagonist, 
Robert, realizes that Captain Leather is about to allow hundreds of 
horses to burn to death, he kills the captain in order to save the animals: 
“if an animal had done this — we would call it mad and shoot it,” he 
explains (178). 
In The Time in Between, as in The Wars, it is storytelling, the act 
of remembering and retelling the past, which emerges as a specifically 
human pursuit that differentiates humans from animals while simul-
taneously connecting them through the “rhetorical neighbourhood” 
it creates. This emphasis on reading and storytelling also appears as a 
self-reflexive comment on Bergen’s own fictional project and reminds 
us that any meaning located by characters in, or readers of, the novel 
exists only in the aesthetic realm. Still, The Time in Between is able to 
offer a humanistic, subjective portrayal (albeit fictional) of the struggle 
to locate meaning in the aftermath of the Vietnam war, which entails 
a movement away from an empirical, objective understanding of the 
events. This connection between narration and remembering points 
to the ethical considerations involved in telling stories. The acceptance 
of ignorance and the letting go of knowledge that both Ada and her 
father experience might also be read as a form of consolation for the 
inability to affect or intervene in the very real acts of violence that have 
already occurred. Through their attempt to remember and make sense 
of the past, Ada and Charles are ultimately brought into a position of 
not knowing, a position that suggests the ethical value of abandoning 
the desire to obtain totalizing knowledge for an acceptance of epistemic 
limits and an openness toward the Other. 
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By demonstrating the interrelationality of past and present and of 
humans and animals — the ways in which human experiences of death 
and suffering recall descriptions of animal deaths and suffering — The 
Time in Between suggests the potential value of looking back at death 
in order to move forward into a more ethical relationship with the 
Other. The very title references the temporal play in the novel: while 
time progresses and Charles and Ada evolve as characters, they psy-
chologically travel into the past through their desire to remember and 
understand earlier events. This looking back seems to forge connections 
not only between past and present, but also between life and death: as 
Ada tells Jon after their father’s suicide, “Dad’s death is hovering some-
where beside us” (187). The connection between the family’s last name 
(Boatman), the ferry journeys that frame the novel, and the Greek myth 
of Charon, the ferryman in Hades who carried souls across the rivers 
Acheron and Styx to the world of the dead, alludes to the ambiguous 
and dreamlike space6 in between life and death that Charles and Ada 
occupy as they search for meaning in Vietnam.
The novel does, however, point to the dangers of focusing on the 
past rather than engaging with the present. Indeed, it shows that the 
ability to “turn back” to face what is behind is a Western privilege; 
although Ada wants the Vietnamese people in the village to remember 
her father’s crime, Hoang Vu, the Vietnamese artist who becomes Ada’s 
lover, explains that the people are more concerned with surviving and 
moving forward: “they don’t want to remember” (212).7 In many ways, 
Ada continues the search to find meaning in the past that her deceased 
father begins: as Vu observes, “Your father . . . needed to go back. As 
do you, Ada” (215). Still, while Ada continues to attempt to understand 
her father and the past, she is, like Charles, made increasingly aware 
of the impossibility of doing so. Early in the novel, her desire to know 
what has happened to her father is contrasted with her brother’s lack of 
interest. Confronted by Ada’s questioning of his apparent indifference, 
Jon responds, “You want to know, Ada. And because you’re so desper-
ate you think I should want the same thing. Well, I don’t. Okay? I just 
don’t” (74). Ada’s desire “to know” is presented as a simultaneously 
enlightening and selfish pursuit. Shortly after Jon refuses to take part 
in her search to find their father, Ada recalls a memory from childhood 
in which she and Jon discover a nest of baby birds whose mother has a 
broken wing: 
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Ada told [Jon] to come look. He said no. He said the birds would 
die. Yes, she said, but you can still come look. He shook his head 
and left her there. A few days later, when she went back alone to 
find the nest, the family was dead. The mother had managed to 
spin her way to the rocks below the nest. The babies were feather-
less and curled into one another. Their chests were translucent, like 
blue glass. (75)
In the context of Ada’s need to know about her father, the passage pro-
leptically indicates Charles’s fate and speaks to Ada’s desire to under-
stand or “know” life and death, but it also suggests that she aestheticizes 
death and, like her father, focuses on it at the expense of engaging with 
the living.
Charles’s memory of the bodies of the deceased seems to indicate 
that looking back is both desirable and inescapable. For example, when 
Charles dreams about his dead ex-wife, Sara, he sees “her head turned 
back to him as if to say goodbye” (39), a physical turning back that is 
echoed in his memory of the Vietnamese boy he murders whose head is 
“turned slightly as if to look over his shoulder” (43). In both cases, the 
bodies Charles dreams about seem to suggest a reciprocal looking back: 
as Charles looks back at death, death seems to look back at Charles. The 
monk in Dang Tho’s story comments explicitly on this relationship: 
talking “about life and death,” the monk asserts, “you cannot have one 
without the knowledge of the other. . . . [L]ife feeds on death and death 
on life” (92). Increasingly, though, Charles chooses to remember the 
past that “arrives, uninvited,” despite his initial efforts to “send it away” 
(42). This choice to remember, to reflect on past decisions, emerges as a 
particularly humanizing pursuit. Rather than attempt to “not go there” 
or to “wipe out this nightmare,” as his friend and fellow soldier Harry 
suggests he do, Charles makes the narcissistic decision to leave his chil-
dren and return to Vietnam to confront his past actions (42).
The description of the murders Charles commits appears immedi-
ately after Harry’s dismissive statement about remembering and seems 
to demonstrate a resistance to wilful forgetting. Having shot the boy, 
Charles shoots a pig and a dog, “as if to underscore the necessity” (43; 
emphasis added). This explanation immediately deconstructs itself: like 
the little boy who “didn’t have a gun” (43), the animals are unarmed 
and uninvolved in the war. They do not pose a threat and there is, 
therefore, no necessity to kill them. It is here perhaps that the novel 
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most overtly questions the “necessity” of killing. By killing beings whose 
deaths he considers “acceptable,” Charles seems to attempt to negate the 
value of the boy’s life by reducing him to an animal position.8 These 
deaths raise questions for the characters and perhaps for readers about 
which lives are recognized, and, to use Butler’s words from her critique 
of violence, are “worth valuing and preserving” (Precarious Life 34). As 
is the case elsewhere in the novel, Bergen seems to engage with historical 
notions of race and animality in which certain humans were considered 
as belonging to a distinct species.9 The ethical dangers of refusing to 
acknowledge a living being’s ability to experience death and suffering 
are explored through Bergen’s depiction of the murders that Charles 
commits.10 Choosing to kill the dog and the pig in Vietnam, Charles 
not only assumes that the animals do not exist individually as subjects 
and therefore cannot die, but, in killing them to “underscore the neces-
sity,” he also places the boy outside of a subject position by attempting to 
“necessitate” his death with the deaths of those (animals) whose lives he 
deems expendable. Although the murders Charles commits complicate 
his humanity, his active remembering and attempt to understand his 
actions appear as very human endeavours. 
Arguments around the necessity of killing are, of course, prevalent in 
the context of war, but they are also examined in the narrative through 
the killing of animals. For example, Charles’s daughter Del announces 
her decision to become vegetarian after she witnesses the seemingly 
unnecessary killing and mutilation of Rosie, the pullet. Charles attempts 
to justify Rosie’s death and dissection to his children by claiming, “we 
were going to eat her anyway. She’s just furthering our education,” to 
which Del responds, “But she is Rosie” (35). Del cannot partake in 
the dissection because she grants the pullet an identity as a subject. 
Furthermore, the scene is implicitly connected to human deaths through 
the comment Charles makes to his children directly before killing Rosie: 
“artists throughout the centuries, lacking models, had used cadavers” 
(35). Replying to Jon’s subsequent question about the meaning of the 
word cadavers, Del answers, “A dead body, stupid” (35). That the refer-
ence to dead human bodies immediately precedes Rosie’s dissection 
suggests that Del identifies a relation between Rosie’s body and the 
human body, rendering her unable to subject the pullet to the eviscera-
tion that Charles encourages. The connection between cadavers and 
the dead pullet draws attention to the materiality of bodies, whether 
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human or animal, but again suggests that the ability to question death 
is a uniquely human quality. 
Charles’s opinion that animal lives are expendable, however, appears 
to change over time and is increasingly challenged by his dreams and 
memories. Frequently, in dreams and thoughts, Charles recalls animal 
deaths as well as human deaths, implying that he recognizes a certain 
value in the lives of animals and acknowledges their suffering. This 
concern with experiences of suffering, both human and animal, runs 
throughout the novel and seems to differentiate the human from the 
animal. Indeed, images of human cruelty are often implicitly echoed 
in images of cruelty to animals; for example, Charles sees “a boy being 
beaten with a stick by two other boys while several people looked on 
and laughed” (139), which is later mirrored by the copulating dogs 
Ada sees running “in circles while a young boy beat them with a stick” 
(220). Charles’s dream about the horrific death of a friend in Vietnam 
and the violent mutilation of a pig similarly connects human and animal 
suffering: “he dreamed about severed limbs and fire and the intestines 
of Jody Booth, a friend who had died beside him in a field outside 
Danang. He dreamed about pigs being strung from a rope and gutted 
alive and he dreamed about a young boy who looked up at him as if to 
ask, ‘Why?’” (26). Including the description of animal deaths and of the 
“young boy” in the same sentence, Bergen invites us to read the boy’s 
question (which is also, of course, Charles’s question) as a reference to 
the killing of the pigs as well as an implicit interrogation of Charles’s 
shooting of the boy. The dream implies that Charles, like Del, inwardly 
questions his stance on animal deaths and suffering. 
In turn, this questioning also guides the reader’s interpretation of 
animal death in relation to human death in the novel. In In a Dark 
Wood, the confessional narrative embedded within The Time in Between, 
Kiet’s murder of the woman and the young baby not only parallels 
Charles’s murder of the Vietnamese boy, but also is echoed in scenes 
that depict the killing of pigs. In Tho’s story, Kiet has “difficulty killing 
the pig” (88), presumably because he is reminded of the murder of the 
mother and child. Each death reminds the reader, as it reminds Kiet, of 
previous deaths in the narrative, and so forces the reader to participate 
in the process of “turning back” that Charles and Ada demonstrate. 
After learning about her father’s suicide and reading Tho’s story, Ada 
imagines that “the objects in the room had become shapes of animals 
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and men” and she sees an image of “her father and Kiet standing side 
by side” (251). This hallucination explicitly comments on the doubling 
between Charles and Kiet, but the pairing of “animals and men” and of 
“Charles and Kiet” also suggests the connection between humans and 
animals. Certainly, the image of Kiet holding the knife while he con-
siders the “pig’s heavy neck” and hears its “screaming” (87) recalls the 
horrific description of the human murders he commits: “the brilliance 
of the sun off the blade of the scythe, the thin red line at the baby’s 
throat, an infant’s howl descending into a mother’s wail, and then that 
wailing, too, gone, disappearing like the pink bubble that rose from the 
opening at the mother’s neck” (84). The scene is echoed a third time in 
the main narrative when Ada watches Chi push “the blade of the knife 
into the [pig’s] throat,” hears the “tearing of flesh,” and watches a “thin 
rope of blood hit Chi’s chest” (231). In this case, the description of the 
pig’s death also returns the reader to Charles’s act of murder: “Chi’s 
arms and legs were bloody” after killing the pig (231), just as Charles 
has “blood on his arms and boots” (45) after shooting the boy and the 
animals. The impact that Tho’s story has on Ada and Charles, and on 
the reader (as well as the similarities between In a Dark Wood and The 
Time in Between), highlights the importance of storytelling as an aspect 
of the novel’s own rhetorical practice but also as a redemptive pursuit. 
Although not made explicit, Ada’s reaction to witnessing the pig’s death, 
which makes her “feel dizzy” and prompts her to wash “her hands and 
face” as though to cleanse herself from her visual participation in the 
killing, suggests that she, like the reader, makes the connection between 
the murder of the pig, the murder of mother and child in Tho’s story, 
and the murder Charles commits (231). Ada’s impulse to wash herself, 
as well as her imagining a “white room with a bed and clean sheets and 
a window that offered a view of a perfectly clear sky” (231), indicates 
her desire to return to a moment of moral cleanliness and perfection in 
which she has no responsibility — a desire that mirrors her father’s quest 
for meaning and redemption. 
Like the baby that Kiet kills, the pig that Chi kills “howls” before 
it dies. The connection of the human and the animal through these 
howls points to the role that language or “voice” plays in rendering the 
Other a recognizable subject. Charles appears increasingly reluctant to 
take animal life, and although he hopes that “the prospect of stalking a 
wolf or a bear through the bush would carry him away,” hunting leads 
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him “more and more . . . into a darker place” (99). Charles seems to hear 
the “voice” of the animal when he encounters the wolf that Del’s lover, 
Tomas, shoots and maims during a hunting trip. Although Charles is 
presented with the opportunity to kill the injured wolf, he allows it to 
live. In many ways, this scene appears as a re-enactment of the Vietnam 
shootings, especially given Charles’s admission that hunting reminds 
him of “walking point” in Vietnam: Charles is faced a second time 
with the option to kill a human and an animal but on this occasion 
decides not to kill the wolf, or to kill Tomas, whom he wants “for a 
small moment” to shoot (101). Charles does not give Tomas a reason 
for not killing the wolf but cryptically tells him: “[we] make certain 
decisions and the decisions take on a story and the story has a history 
of its own” (102). The remark, which serves as another reminder of the 
significance of storytelling in Bergen’s narrative, expresses Charles’s 
need to correct his previous decisions and to “re-write” his story in order 
to avoid repeating a history that he so regrets. His dream about the wolf 
suggests the significance of his choice: “During the night he woke from 
a dream in which he had come face to face with the wolf and shot it 
between the eyes. . . . In the dream, just before he had killed the wolf, it 
had called out in a language that was mournful and ancient” (103). The 
dreamed shooting of the wolf presents a stark alternative to the actual 
decision Charles makes not to kill the wolf. We might read the dreamed 
“face-to-face” interaction between Charles and the wolf in terms of a 
Levinasian ethics, where one is faced with a temptation to kill as well 
as a command not to kill as one looks at the Other.11 In “Ethics and 
Spirit,” Levinas observes, 
The face, for its part, is inviolable; those eyes, which are abso-
lutely without protection, the most naked part of the human body, 
nonetheless offer an absolute resistance to possession, an absolute 
resistance in which the temptation to murder is inscribed. . . . This 
temptation to murder and this impossibility of murder constitute 
the very vision of the face. To see a face is already to hear “You shall 
not kill.” (6) 
While Levinas suggests that only humans can have a “face,” Charles’s 
decision not to kill the wolf during the actual hunt seems to resist such 
anthropocentric thinking and thus challenges Levinas’s position. In “A 
Missed Opportunity,” Paola Cavalieri points out that Levinas’s theoreti-
cal privileging of passivity in the interaction between subject and Other 
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is contradicted by the re-emergence, in his thinking of the animal-
human relationship, of “the Same that he has so strongly challenged. 
The Same — that is, just that consciousness that knowledge and free-
dom allow to subjugate the Other” (105-106). Charles’s recognition of 
the wolf, a recognition that allows the animal to live, may then be read 
as a kind of ethical passivity toward the animal that acknowledges its 
vulnerability. In making the decision not to kill, Charles suggests that 
he sees a face, hears the mournful language of the wolf, and translates 
it into a demand not to kill. This “language” appears as a plea for life 
and as a demand to be recognized as a subject, and functions in a simi-
lar way to the mother’s “wail” and the baby’s “howl” in Tho’s story, the 
pig’s “screaming” in the central narrative, and the “question” that the 
Vietnamese boy appears to be asking as Charles kills him (45). 
Bergen’s novel gestures to the role that refusing language plays in the 
process of refusing subjectivity, which resonates with Butler’s argument 
that language is a weapon in war that can produce lives or negate them 
(Precarious Life 1-18). On another level, however, the novel suggests that 
the face of the Other signals an “utterance that is not, strictly speaking, 
linguistic” (133), that the face is in itself “a kind of sound, the sound of 
language evacuating its sense” (134). The “utterances” of the mother, 
child, wolf, and pigs may each be read not as a “linguistic” language, 
but metaphorically as a “wordless vocalization of suffering that marks 
the limits of linguistic translation” (134). Indeed, in her work on tor-
ture and pain, Elaine Scarry argues that pain “does not simply resist 
language but actively destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion 
to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being 
makes before language is learned” (4). Like the “ancient” language of 
the wolf that Charles hears in his dream, the pig that Chi slaughters 
emits a similarly “wordless vocalization” of suffering: “The screams 
were higher now, and they filled the courtyard like some ancient and 
infernal call” (231). Although the repetition of the word “ancient” adds 
a mystical and dreamlike tone to the description of both pig and wolf, 
the brutally stark account of the pig’s death and the syntactical focus on 
its body — “neck,” “snout,” “throat,” “flesh,” “blood” — draws atten-
tion to its material life. Not only is the pig’s death horrific in itself but 
its “voice” also forces the reader to recall descriptions of human killings 
in the novel: the pig’s “screams” evoke a human response to such suf-
fering, and its “howls [become] muted and muffled” (231), just as the 
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“infant’s howl” is silenced in Dang Tho’s narrative (84). Indeed, the 
novel increasingly conflates animal and human “voices” to the extent 
that Ada seems unable to distinguish between the two: “Someone was 
sweeping leaves in the neighbour’s yard. Voices, the yelp of a puppy, cry 
of a small child” (229). Here, it is the reader’s task to recognize the suf-
fering of human individuals (the crying mother and child, for example) 
as separate from that of the animal.
For Charles, animal voices assume a profound significance. Dogs, 
in particular, are intimately connected to Charles throughout the novel 
and seem, at times, to appear as redemptive figures. When recalling his 
interaction with Harry during the war, for example, Charles describes 
how “in the village” (presumably the village where he kills the boy 
and the animals), “a dog that had survived lifted its head and howled 
at the sun” (42). That this recollection occurs immediately before the 
first description of the Vietnam killings indicates that the dog’s howl 
somehow connects to Charles’s own reaction to the deaths: the dog 
seems intrinsically linked to Charles’s memory of the killings, and its 
howl appears to vocalize Charles’s own suffering — the grief that he 
experiences but cannot express. The dog that Charles shoots during the 
war seems to establish this relationship; it is described as “a mongrel. 
An ugly little thing with a crippled back leg. No hair on the back, as if 
it were a large rat that deserved to die” (43; emphasis added). That the 
dog’s poor physical appearance provides Charles with reason to think 
it deserves to die indicates the arbitrariness of his decision to shoot. 
However, because the dog reappears at the scene of Charles’s own death, 
it acquires meaning in Charles’s life, like the animals in his dreams, that 
transcends its apparently abject status. When Charles decides that he, 
too, “deserves to die,” a dog emerges “out of the darkness” and stands 
“before him, growling” (154). The dog appears and then disappears just 
before Charles drowns, suggesting that it may be a hallucination of the 
dog he remembers killing in the war. The passage continues,
Its rear end was furless and as the animal circled Charles could see 
that it favoured a hind leg; a reprobate creature that saw an equal in 
Charles. Charles picked up a stick and swung out, hitting the dog 
across the snout. It howled and backed away, its rear furrowing the 
sand. “Get lost, you piece of shit,” Charles said, and the dog tilted 
its head, as if the language it heard was unexpected. (154)
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There is a sense that the dog listens to Charles’s “unexpected” language 
in a way that highlights Charles’s refusal of the dog’s communication 
and also builds upon the novel’s refusal of Levinas’s suggestion that 
only humans can have a face; here, as in Charles’s dream of the wolf, a 
moment of face-to-face recognition passes between Charles and the ani-
mal. As the dog recognizes Charles as “an equal,” as a similarly “repro-
bate creature,” Charles’s unprovoked violent reaction to the dog implies 
that he recognizes the dog as a kind of embodied reminder of his crime 
in Vietnam — an emblem of his immoral act. His violent lashing out, 
then, indicates a certain self-admonishment for his past actions but also 
a refusal to confront and live with those actions. Indeed, this dog, whose 
howls make him seem “aware of what was to pass” (155), appears as an 
embodiment of Besner’s description of redemption in Bergen’s fiction: 
“a dim and receding, but also a vital and necessary hope — invoked, 
ironized, then revoked” (par. 4). In this sense, the dog appears to be 
not so much a subject as a rhetorical device that encourages the reader 
to consider the “humanness” of Charles’s actions. 
The possibility that the dog operates as a kind of double to Charles 
is implied a few pages earlier. After his lover, Elaine, leaves, Charles goes 
down to the harbour and sees in the water “the corpse of a dog, hugely 
distended, moving back and forth with the waves” (146). The lines that 
follow indicate the significance of this drowned dog: “Footsteps behind 
him. He turned as three men in suits passed by. Charles stepped back. 
He heard the men’s sudden laughter and the wind and the clicking of 
the palm trees. The bloated moon. A hole had opened up before him” 
(146). Apparently distanced from “the human,” from the men and their 
laughter, Charles chooses to commit himself to the same fate as the dead 
dog; after his suicide, Charles’s own corpse is found, “grey and bloated,” 
moving in the waves, just like the dog (159). The “hole” that opens 
before Charles might, then, be read as his recognition of his inability to 
make sense of the past, but also of his own precariousness in his posi-
tion as human subject. Yet, although the bodies of both Charles and 
dog are similar in death, the novel suggests that it is Charles’s attempt 
to remember and make sense of his past that returns him to the realm 
of the human. As Charles tells his children in his suicide note, “he 
had imagined coming back to this place and solving some mystery, 
that then he would understand what had happened to him,” but in the 
end, “Nothing made sense” (168). Choosing to die like the animal that 
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reminds him of his crime suggests that Charles lets go of the notion 
of himself as a superior being, as well as of his search to “make sense.” 
Ada’s remark about the rat that Vu later captures and drowns — “it 
was a terrible thing to think of an animal drowning” (241) — seems 
to comment on her father’s death. But the fact that Charles chooses to 
die this way, a distinctly human decision, ultimately renders him more 
human than animal. Although his suicide allows Charles to assert con-
trol over his death in a way that is not available to the boy he kills or to 
the animals in the story, it may also be read as sacrificial.12 By giving 
up his search for meaning in Vietnam to consciously step into the void 
of death, or the “hole” that opens before him as he gazes at the corpse 
of the dead dog, Charles seems to accept a position of ignorance and 
unknowingness. As Vu tells Ada, “killing one’s self required strength. It 
was like running toward danger. Running toward the unknown” (215). 
The humanness of Charles’s ref lecting, remembering, and deci-
sion-making in life is contrasted by the position he assumes in death. 
However, Bergen complicates the vulnerability of this position by situ-
ating the human-animal relationships he presents in an ecologically 
ordered system. Indeed, just as wartime killing has traditionally been 
associated with the presumed brutality of animal “nature,” once dead, 
Charles’s body is “dissected” by animals in a way that reverses his own 
treatment of Rosie, the pullet: parts of his body are eaten, his eyes are 
pried free by a swimming crab, and seahorses “study the holes” (156). 
This scene seems to make porous the human-animal divide by point-
ing to the unstable boundary between the recognized human body and 
f lesh, but it also reveals the changing ecological position of Charles’s 
body. The blunt description of Charles’s death and decomposition seems 
to mock the self-absorbed search for redemption that drives his journey 
to Vietnam. Rather than finding salvation in relationships with others, 
Charles dies alone and blinded by his impossible quest to return to an 
ethically pure state — it is not surprising that after his death his “eyes 
would go first” (156). In this perversion of the ecological pyramid, the 
crab that eats Charles’s eyes appears, like the dog, as a rhetorical fig-
ure that highlights Charles’s myopic vision and redeems him, albeit in 
death, from the trap of outward rather than inward sight.
Charles’s death, his suicide note, and the story about Kiet that Ada 
eventually reads draw her into a position where she becomes acutely 
aware of her father’s suffering and of the human potential to fail to 
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recognize the Other, human or animal, as a subject. This recognition is 
such that it leads her to break down the boundary between human and 
animal and to tell Vu that she is “some small animal” (227). Following 
this realization, Ada forces herself to watch Chi slaughter a pig: “Ada 
stood just inside the doorway and shuddered slightly. She wanted to 
but did not leave. She did not turn away” (230). Walking home directly 
after watching the pig’s death, she experiences an apparent revelation:
A man on a motorcycle called out, You, and then again, You, until 
she turned to him and cried, “I do not know you.” He laughed and 
drove away. She bent her head and carried on, watching her feet 
as they moved, aware that a window had been f lung open onto a 
view of an alien and foreign place, and then, just as suddenly, it 
had closed. (232) 
The passage suggests that the pig’s death induces Ada’s recognition of 
her inability to understand or make sense of death and her father’s past, 
but also her inability to know or fully understand another being. As her 
declaration, “I do not know you,” appears after an event that evokes her 
father’s actions, it is inviting to read it as referring to her father, Chi, 
the pig, and even Vu, who deserts Ada a few pages earlier, as well as the 
anonymous motorcyclist. Indeed, throughout the novel, Ada’s assump-
tions about others and her desire to “know” are continually challenged. 
For example, Dat, the police officer in Danang who helps Ada and Jon 
look for their father, tells her, “You must not assume to know me” (57). 
Vu, whose name suggests his insight, models this openness for Ada, 
telling her that “to talk too much about Ada would reduce Ada” (266). 
These epistemological issues link back to storytelling: the narratives 
within the novel, Charles’s confessional suicide note, and Tho’s In a 
Dark Wood, for example, confront the characters, and the reader, with 
the impossibility of ever truly knowing another’s story. Building on 
Levinas’s philosophy, Butler asserts,
As we ask to know the other, or ask that the other say, finally or 
definitively, who she or he is, it will be important not to expect an 
answer that can ever satisfy. By not pursuing satisfaction, and by 
letting the question remain open, even enduring, we let the other 
live, since life might be understood as precisely that which exceeds 
any account we may try to give of it. If letting the other live is part 
of any ethical definition of recognition, then this version will be less 
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based on knowledge than on an apprehension of epistemic limits. 
(Giving an Account 42-43)
In approaching a position of ignorance, an acceptance of the impos-
sibility of knowing, Charles and Ada, in separate ways, move toward a 
more ethical position. 
The novel does not, however, diminish the difficulty of achieving 
such a position; indeed, despite her apparent reconsideration of the value 
of human and animal life and her realization of her inability to “know” 
another being, Ada enacts a kind of ethical violence on the young boy, 
Yen, who attempts to assist her during her stay in Vietnam. Yen’s gen-
erosity toward Ada and his perceptive comments on her emotions — it 
is Yen, for example, who recognizes her pain at leaving Vu — are not 
reciprocated by Ada, who is dismissive of the young boy’s affection; 
as Yen disappointedly tells her, “You don’t take me seriously” (269). 
Just as Charles refuses the “language” of the dog that follows him to 
the water, Ada refuses to listen to Yen, or to recognize his position as 
a subject. Indeed, the novel suggests a further doubling between Yen, 
who loyally follows Ada during her time in Vietnam, and the figure of 
the dog that haunts Charles. In the novel’s final pages, Ada discovers 
Yen in her room “holding her underwear and whispering to himself,” 
and she reacts violently in a way that mirrors her father’s reaction to 
the dog that growls at him on the beach before he drowns: “reaching 
him, she struck his head with an open hand. He ducked and because he 
ducked and seemed so helpless, she struck him again. This time with 
her fist and she felt the softness at the side of his face” (271). As the dog 
appears as a redemptive figure for Charles, Yen, too, may be read as a 
redemptive figure for Ada. Her search for meaning and redemption, 
like her father’s, is based on an apparent desire to return to a kind of 
prelapsarian existence of ethical purity that is devoid of responsibility 
and wrongdoing. The narcissistic nature of her search is highlighted 
by Yen, who offers Ada a mode of redemption that is based on human 
interaction; her refusal of Yen — like Charles’s refusal of the dog and, in 
some ways, of his own children — is also, then, a refusal to be redeemed 
through human relationships. 
Although Ada later wanders through the streets calling his name, 
suggesting that she feels remorse for her actions and wishes to apologise, 
the violence she displays toward Yen, as is the case with Charles and the 
dog on the beach, seems to stem from her recognition of their common-
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ality: like Ada, Yen experiences an ambiguous sadness, and he reaches 
out to her emotionally and physically in a way that echoes her own 
reaching out to Vu. Yen appears to understand Ada’s pain in a way that 
she finds threatening. When the pair first meet, for example, Yen indi-
cates his understanding of Ada’s suffering in his dismissal of her hired 
translator, Dinh: “‘He is very well educated but he doesn’t understand 
people.’ Yen patted his stomach. ‘Here,’ he said. ‘He doesn’t understand 
things right here’” (14). When Yen appears in her room, Ada wonders if 
he is “dangerous” and looks “around for an object to hold, something 
to protect herself ” before attacking him (271).13 The scene resonates 
with the murder Charles commits in Vietnam, where the young boy 
who appears to be asking Charles a question (like Yen, who wants to 
talk to Ada about the bicycle) is assumed to be dangerous and is vio-
lently dispatched. Although Ada increasingly recognizes the suffering 
of animals and of her father and the victims of the war, she fails to 
recognize Yen’s suffering. This is not to say that the novel dismisses the 
task of responsibility as one that will inevitably fail, but rather that it is 
concerned with presenting the complexity of the struggles involved in 
moving toward an ethical position.
By foregrounding death in the lives of its characters, Bergen’s novel 
speaks to the ways in which lives are valued or devalued and highlights 
the ethical potential of remembering the dead in the process of living. 
The Time in Between suggests that storytelling is inextricably linked 
to remembering; it is through storytelling, remembering, and think-
ing that one is confronted by the limits of one’s ability to know, but 
also by the humanness of one’s existence. By suggesting a commonality 
between human and animal deaths, the novel explores the frailty and 
limits of the human position, particularly the limits of knowing, and the 
struggles involved in having a responsibility toward the Other.
Notes
1 Such issues arise in A Year of Lesser (1996), See the Child (1999), The Case of Lena 
S. (2003), The Retreat (2008), and in Bergen’s most recent novel, The Matter with Morris 
(2010).
2 My use of the term Other draws on the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas — for whom 
the Other is not knowable — and Judith Butler, for whom the ethical recognition of the 
Other is founded on the acknowledgment of one’s own epistemic limits. Although both 
Levinas and Butler position the Other as specifically human, I suggest that their thinking 
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may be used to consider the non-human Other. As Butler writes in Giving an Account of 
Oneself, “An ability to affirm what is contingent and incoherent in oneself may allow one 
to affirm others who may or may not ‘mirror’ one’s own constitution” (41).
3 Butler’s position echoes Levinas’s focus on passivity as central to ethical relations; as 
Paola Cavalieri argues, Levinas’s ethical theory is “innovative” in its “avowed centrality of 
passivity against the long-standing obsession with knowledge and power” (104).
4 Here, I refer to the “dark woods” in terms of the meaning they are ascribed in the 
Inferno: as broadly representative of sin and of the “‘straight path’ lost,” as well as of “some 
kind of internal morass” (Zimmerman xi). 
5 See David Ingham’s article “Bashing the Fascists: The Moral Dimensions of Findley’s 
Fiction” for a discussion of human-animal relationships in The Wars.
6 In an interview with Nikaela Peters, Bergen refers to The Time in Between as “interior” 
and “dream-like” (“Interview”).
7 Svetlana Boym’s work on nostalgia is pertinent here with regards to the difficulties 
of remembering. Writing about the experience of immigrants, Boym connects the fear of 
looking back to the story of Lot’s wife: “a fear that looking back might paralyze you forever, 
turning you into a pillar of salt, a pitiful monument to your own grief” (xv).
8 In When Species Meet, Donna Haraway argues that “it is a misstep to separate the 
world’s beings into those who may be killed and those who may not and a misstep to pre-
tend to live outside killing” (79). See “Sharing Suffering: Instrumental Relations” in When 
Species Meet for a detailed theoretical ref lection on human and animal death. 
9 See Romantic Ecologies and Colonial Cultures in the British-Atlantic World 1770-1850, 
in which Kevin Hutchings discusses how “race and species, as categories of difference, were 
conflated, [and] various racial groups were deemed separate and distinct species rather than 
members of the same human family” (50).
10 Charles’s position on animal deaths evokes Heideggarian theories of Dasein and 
death. For Heidegger, “Dasein is an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is an issue” 
(Being and Time 236). In other words, a Dasein is troubled by its own existence and impend-
ing death in a way that animals, according to Heidegger, and apparently Charles, are not. 
From this principle, Heidegger argues that animals cannot experience death: “To die means 
to be capable of death. Only man dies. The animal perishes. It has neither death ahead of 
itself nor behind it” (“The Thing” 176).
11 In “The Animal that Therefore I am (More to Follow),” Derrida edges close to 
Levinas when he argues that when the animal looks at us, we are stripped of thought and 
philosophy and brought into a position of ignorance from which we can begin to think: 
“The animal looks at us, and we are naked before it. Thinking perhaps begins here” (397). 
Charles’s dream, in which he looks into the face of the wolf, might be considered through 
the lens of Derrida’s notion of “thinking” about the animal. 
12 See Ervin Beck’s “Resolving Dualisms in David Bergen’s Sitting Opposite My Brother” 
for a discussion of Bergen’s use of the “martyr archetype” in his 1993 short-story collection. 
13 One might argue that Yen’s interest in Ada’s underwear vaguely implies that he 
might commit an act of (sexual) violence toward her; however, Yen’s desire to talk to Ada, 
his passive response to her aggressive reaction, and his kindness toward her throughout the 
novel counters this reading.
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